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 1 
 
Introduction to the Material Study of Global Constitutional Law 
 
 
 
 
This article engages with the debate(s) on global constitutional law and constitutionalism1 
with the aim of showing that some of its insights cannot be ignored, and it is actually 
fruitful, in terms of constitutional analysis, to take them into account. However, the valuable 
introjection of these intuitions depends on the adoption of a material angle of analysis. 
Hence, the main task of this article is to sketch out what means to address global 
constitutional law from this methodological point of view.2 I will first introduce the origins of 
the idea of the material study of the constitutional order by focussing on the notion of the 
material constitution in the Marxist and institutionalist canons; in the second section I will 
highlight some limits of these approaches, in particular the absence of a proper reflection 
on its conception of the political economy. In the third and fourth sections, I will use these 
lenses in order to address some aspects of the phenomenon of global constitutional law 
with a view to show how this has mostly affected state’s constitutional law. Finally, I will 
highlight one of the main contributions of global constitutional law, that is, the confirmation 
of the relational (and not absolute) nature of sovereignty. This implies that while the debate 
on global constitutional law tends to be pitched often at the level of purely normative or 
functional understandings, in the opposite field (almost exclusively State-centred) an 
inaccurate or inflated conception of sovereignty provides the intellectual background of a 
position that is prevented from recognising the recent remarkable transformations of the 
state. A material approach to global constitutional law, while maintaining the centrality of 
the state as the main unit of analysis, can circumvent the difficulty of an absolutist 
conception of sovereignty. 
 
I. The Material Study of the Constitutional Order 
 
The starting point for a material study of the constitutional order is the notion of the 
‘constitution in the material sense’. This notion has been taken up by constitutional and 
political theorists at important and specific junctures of historical constitutional 
developments. First, the notion has been used, with peculiar materialist and determinist 
traits by Marxist scholars. The idea is that in order to explain and understand the 
constitutional order it is necessary to look into the formation and reformation of societal 
order. From a Marxist perspective, this means that the organisation and regulation of 
modes and relations of production is critical – as it works as the lynchpin of societal 
reproduction. Yet, this first wave of studies of the constitutional order inspired by Marxist 
                                                     
1 For the purposes of this article I will take into account all those strands that have taken up the challenge of 
the globalization of constitutional norms and principles, from global constitutionalism to the 
constitutionalisation of international law, despite, it goes without saying, crucial differences among these 
positions. Forms of supranational law (such as the EU or the Council of Europe) are also taken into 
consideration. For an overview of the debate see C. Schwöbel, ‘Situating the Debate on Global 
Constitutionalism’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 611-635. 
2 For an accurate analysis of the legitimacy claims in favour or against global constitutionalism see C. Mac 
Amleigh, ‘Harmonising Global Constitutionalism’ (2016) 5 Global Constitutionalism 173-206. 
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doctrines has been incredibly reductionist both in its conception of the law and in its 
relation with society. Marx himself allows for this interpretation, most famously in his 
‘Preface to the Critique of Political Economy’: ‘The totality of [..] relations of production 
forms the economic structure of society, the real basis from which rises a legal and political 
superstructure, and to which correspond specific forms of social consciousness’.3 This is 
known as the formalisation of the structure/suprastructure frame of understanding of the 
relation between the production and reproduction of society and the legal order. If 
interpreted rigidly, it invites the idea that the law is an ideological mask applied over already 
existent social relations (of production) and, at best, it serves as a veneer of legitimacy over 
deeply unfair arrangements. No autonomous status is granted to the constitutional order, 
which is reduced to the mere reflexion of already established processes of production. 
In constitutional thought, the most visible contribution came from Ferdinand Lassalle in the 
19th Century. In a series of conferences on the nature of constitutions, he juxtaposed the 
formal to the ‘real’ constitution with the intention of ‘unmasking’ the role of the former as a 
legitimating cover for the undergirding relations of power and domination. In many places, 
Lassalle states forcefully that what really holds a constitutional order together is the political 
economy of the productive relations of society. To the question ‘what is the nature of the 
constitution?’, Lassalle replied with the following definition: ‘a constitution is the 
fundamental law proclaimed in a country which disciplines the organization of public rights 
in that nation’.4 This is because, fundamentally, Lassalle thought that ‘constitutional 
questions are not primordially legal questions, but a matter of relations of force’.5 By stating 
that the constitution is the fundamental law of the country, Lassalle assumed that it has 
higher value than ordinary law and that it has its own grounding, so that ‘it must be none 
other than what it is. Its basis will not permit it to be otherwise’.6 The political character of 
constitution-making is here purified from any contingency and associated with an idea of 
necessity. The ground of the constitution has to be found ‘always and exclusively in the real 
effective relations among social forces in a given society’.7 What remains unclear is whether 
the real constitution, that is, the constitution of the dominant forces, is also a juridical 
constitution or only a state of affairs which cannot be changed. Lassalle’s imperativist 
conception of law makes the nature of the real constitution ambiguous and, accordingly, the 
same can be said of its relation with the formal constitution. The relation between society 
and constitution is still portrayed as an external one, as if society would first take a concrete 
shape and then it would either use the formal constitution as a cover up for pursuing 
fundamental aims or as a mere registration of undergirding social dynamics. In short, the 
constitution of society is represented as independent from constitutional ordering. 
Furthermore, the limit of such a rigid and dogmatic materialist take is that it underestimates 
the political potential of subjectivity formation. Relations of production are rightly put at the 
centre of the analysis, but they are represented as static and set up from the perspective of 
capitalist primacy. How those relations came to take up those modes and forms of 
production is never turned into a constitutional question. This type of reductionist analysis 
                                                     
3 K. Marx, ‘Preface to the Critique of Political Economy’, in id., Later Political Writings (Cambridge University 
Press 1991) 159-160. 
4 F. Lassalle, ‘On the Essence of Constitutions’ (1862). All quotes are from the English translation available at 
https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/fi/vol03/no01/lassalle.htm 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 
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would not see much of a role for global constitutional law, except for the registration of a 
change undergone at the level of global political economy. Yet, not all Marxist-inspired 
analyses of legal and political orders have been prey of this reductionism and they actually 
became more sophisticated and nuanced. For example, a different judgment should be 
given about the reflection of Antonio Gramsci and of its legacy in constitutional and political 
analysis. In a nutshell, and without any pretence to be exhaustive, Gramsci complicated the 
vulgar materialism of the base-superstructure view. Contrary to the latter, he thought that 
each and every constitutional and political system was the outcome of a number of 
struggles around many sites (not only economic, but cultural, social and political as well), all 
driven by the aim of establishing forms of hegemony.8 This take on materialist analysis 
provided the basis for more recent interventions on law and globalisation (under the 
umbrella of the critique of ‘new constitutionalism’)9 and some of its main tenets will be 
expanded in the second half of this article. In fact, by avoiding a form of reductive 
economicism, this type of materialist approach can introject other important ordering 
factors into its analysis.  
A second wave of material thinking about constitutional orders emerged with the crisis of 
the liberal State and the 1929 financial and economic crises. Here, the transformations of 
the concrete organisation of the State and its political system made visible that the formal 
constitutional order was not enough for capturing the reality of the newly constituted order. 
This is the case because in the liberal State, in light of its objectives, a formal separation of 
powers and the recognition of a series of civil rights were the only necessary constitutional 
conditions in order to let the dominant political forces pursuing their aims. With the crisis of 
that State, the enlargement of the franchise and of trade unionism, the material 
organisation of the State changes substantially and in a way that cannot be ignored any 
longer. It is in this context that the most developed and systematised theory, produced 
along with an institutionalist conception of law, are offered in Germany by Rudolf Smend 
and in Italy by Costantino Mortati.10 The gist of Smend’s contribution has to be seen in the 
idea that the constitutional order is basically an integration process which boosts or 
guarantees social homogeneity, without resorting to the monopoly of force. Actually, his 
main concern seems to be how to avoid that the loss of organic links within society, due to 
the rise of the multi-class state,11 brings about destructive effects upon the unity of the 
state itself. The way to cope with this crisis of political unity is to conceive constitutional 
development as a form of social integration. This concern is based on material grounds 
because the loss of organic links produces distortive and unhealthy dynamics (of 
psychological and sociological nature) between the individual and the community. 
Reflecting on his own intellectual development, Smend would later remember that the 
originating factor of the integration theory was ‘the sight of the political chaos of the sickly 
constitutional state of the 1920s, out of which emerged a desire to offer in contrast the 
original healthy sense of the constitution’.12 Only a dynamic conception of the constitutional 
order can ensure that this ‘sickly constitutional state’ will eventually recover. However, 
                                                     
8 See, for an updated critical analysis, P. Anderson, The Antinomies of Gramsci (Verso 2017). 
9 S. Gill, C. Cutler (eds), New Constitutionalism and the World Order (Cambridge University Press 2014).  
10 C. Mortati, The Constitution in the Material Sense (Routledge 2019, forthcoming).  
11 Cf M. Severo Giannini, Il pubblico potere. Stati e amministrazioni pubbliche (Il Mulino 1986), chapter 3. 
12 R Smend, ‘Integrationslehre’, in Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschften (Fisher 1959) 301fn (quoted by S. 
Korioth, ‘Rudolf Smend’, in A. Jacobson, B. Schlink (eds), Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (University of 
California Press 2002) 210. 
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Smend gives a particular twist to that dynamic and pitches his enquiry at the psychological 
level of the individual conscience. The stability of the legal order depends largely on the 
psychological convictions of the individual in relation to the wider community. As we shall 
see, the problem with this kind of institutionalism is that it still suffers from a deficit of 
materialism. 
A different and still timely approach is put forward by Costantino Mortati, according to 
whom the material constitution is organised around a series of political goals which attract 
a number of other ordering factors : a spatial and temporal matrix (usually instantiated by 
the political unity represented by the sovereign state as a synthesis of these elements)13 
whose unity is held together by the governing function, a series of one or more political 
‘bearers’ (that is, political subjects) of the whole constitutional project (which would be 
identified by Mortati in the system of political parties) and political goals which imprint a 
sense of direction or purpose to the constitutional project. In Mortati’s time, the state 
provides the basic framework where the governing function is exercised through a series of 
powers (or other functions: note that the governing function is not executive power and 
should not be confused with other state powers).14 The governing function is the glue that 
holds a constitutional order together and the pursuing of fundamental goals is a constitutive 
part of the governing function. As we will see later, the recognition of the unifying function 
of governing is essential to re-conceive State sovereignty as well. 
Crucially, from a methodological perspective, what made Mortati’s conception innovative 
compared to similar contemporary approaches, was the way he conceived of the relation 
between the ordering of society and constitutional formation. For example, some of the 
early socialists’ conceptions of the material constitution were based on a unidirectional 
representation of the relation between societal ordering and constitution, the latter being 
treated as an epiphenomenon or even as a mask for covering undergirding relations of 
social and economic power.15 Contrary to that, Mortati thought that law and politics are 
always intertwined in the processes that shape societal organisation and its development. 
As we shall see, this is a precious methodological point because it pushes constitutional 
studies to take into account the coupling of law and politics. Crucially, Mortati believes that 
the constitutional lawyer ought to extend its knowledge to the “juristic level”: ‘[t]he jurist 
does not do sociology, because she does not look out for the factors that determined the 
rise of forces and ideologies on which the state is based; nor does she express any opinion 
about them. By tracing the features that are necessary for conducts and social relations to 
acquire legal significance, she delineates the facts that emerge out of these very relations as 
they unfold within a given order, ones that are to be considered parts of its real 
constitution’.16  
The focus on the relation between societal and constitutional orders is not exclusive to 
Mortati: this is a tenet that he shares with other authors such as the institutionalist Schmitt 
(that is, the Schmitt of the Three Types of Juristic Thought), Heller, and Santi Romano, to 
name but a few. The material sense of the constitution became evident to these authors 
                                                     
13 On the material dimension of this spatial and temporal matrix see the pages by N. Poulantzas, State, Power, 
Socialism (Verso 1980) 88-101. 
14 On this point, in very clear terms, M. Loughlin, the Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press 2003) chapter 
3. 
15 For an illustrative example of this form of determinism, see C. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the US 
Constitution (MacMillan 1913). 
16 C. Mortati, Una e indivisibile (Giuffré 2007) § 18. 
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because of the transformations of the modern State over the interwar period, when 
constitutions and political systems, after the widening of the franchise and the introduction 
of material and social rights became more ‘inclusive’ under the pressure of outstanding new 
needs for integration in society of previously excluded masses. Mortati added an important 
analysis on top of the focus on the internal relation between societal ordering and 
constitutional formation. In fact, the formation of the material constitution by political and 
social forces is the outcome of a condensation of these forces around certain specific 
political aims. According to Mortati, and in crucial different ways from the vision put 
forward by many socialist authors, such a formation constrains the same forces; therefore, 
the material constitution (and, to a certain extent, the formal one) cannot be changed at a 
whim. Governing while pursuing a number of fundamental goals entails a series of 
compromises and constraints: even the hegemonic forces are subject to some of these 
limitations as a condition for the stability and the efficiency of the material constitution.17 
The equilibrium among forces realised through the material constitution has its own logic 
and this one cannot be bent arbitrarily (unless one is willing to pay the price of dissolving 
the material constitution). Even exceptions or states or emergencies are conceived not as 
threats to the constituted order, but as a way to stabilise or even enhance the main tenets 
of a concrete material constitution (by absorbing what is deemed to be extraordinary or 
abnormal into the normality of the societal order). 
Of course, given the contextual origins of this doctrine, one should not adopt Mortati’s 
insights in an indiscriminate and uncritical way. To provide an evident example, the role of 
political parties cannot be described in the same way any longer because parties are not 
what used to be in the 20th century and because the goals of a particular constitutional 
order can be pursued, in contemporary times, by other subjects as well.18 Nonetheless, the 
core of this approach is applicable to a number of other state constitutional orders. For 
example, even the 19th Century liberal state had its own material constitution which 
required a liberal legal order, the rule of law and the protection of civil rights (mainly the 
right to property, but not only this one). Only in this way, the state would have let the 
productive forces of civil society unfold and realise the main aims of economic growth and 
individual freedom of enterprise. The same can be said for the contemporary form(s) of 
global constitutional law. Starting from this assumption, the following section will introduce 
a series of corrections to this approach to the study of the material constitution. 
 
II. Renewing the Material Study of Constitutions 
 
The first wave of doctrines of the material constitution described above has been extremely 
helpful in pinpointing alternatives to what was at the time the dominant doctrinal and 
formal approach of the positivist school of constitutional studies19. Those alternative views 
were formed by conceiving the relationship between society and constitutions in internal 
terms and not as an external application of a constitutional order to an already structured 
and fully-formed society. This means that the formation of constitutional orders is directly 
involved in the shaping of societal organisation. The material basis of constitutional orders 
                                                     
17 Something similar was also advocated by EP Thompson in Whigs and Hunters (Pantheon 1975). 
18 Mortati himself recognised the limits of the party-based political system at the end of his academic career: 
Costituzione (1962), in Una e indivisibile (n 14) 143. 
19 Paul Laband, Hans Kelsen, Carre’ de Malberg, and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, can be deemed to be the most 
representative authors. 
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can be traced back to this level. For this reason, the materiality of modern constitutions 
concerns processes of production and reproduction of societal order, predominantly (but 
not exclusively) through the setting up of modes and relations of production. In political and 
constitutional thought, the processes that lie at the core of the formation of the material 
constitutional order can be defined as differentiation and specification. Both hark back to 
the internal relation between societal formation and constitutional ordering. The process of 
differentiation realises at least two essential components of modern constitutional orders. 
The first one, and most important, is the distinction between those who command and 
those who obey. In brief, this distinction introduces a structure of authority into the 
constitutional order. For institutionalist thinkers of the likes of Romano and Mortati, the 
structure of authority based on the dichotomy command/obedience is the fundamental 
one. The governing function is premised on this distinction. As remarked more recently by 
Martin Loughlin, ‘the business of governing invariably requires the drawing of a distinction 
that has become fundamental to the activity: the division between rulers and ruled, 
between a governing authority and its subjects’.20 But given that differentiation is a process 
taking place internally to society, it is not only limited to the formation of the political and 
constitutional order. In fact, differentiation operates at different systemic levels across 
society and, as highlighted by the material approach to the constitutional order, it is a key 
ordering factor of production and reproduction. Through internal differentiation, the 
political unity of the State (or of any other type of political form) is achieved via the 
organisation and distribution of roles and functions across society. Once again, this process 
has an inherent political quality as it cannot be but organised via collective subjects or 
groups. At this stage, the key institutionalist intuition is the idea that those collective 
subjects are already structured around a set of ideas and principles which carry with them a 
normative force and the latter will later radiate throughout the constitutional order.21  
The principle of specification implies the identification of the social and political forces 
whose role is essential for steering the governing function. If constitutional analysis is 
centred on production, then the definition of its political economy entails the specification 
of how modes and relations of production are organised. The principle of specification 
distributes functions and roles to different groups, but one ought to avoid the mistake of 
conceiving differentiation as a process utterly distinguished from specification. It is most 
likely that these two principles operate at the same time on the organisation of the political 
economy of the constitutional order. The individuation of which groups are attributed 
certain functions is generally intertwined with the organisation and differentiation of 
functions and roles themselves.22 
                                                     
20 M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (n 12) 5. 
21 It would be predictable to trace back this type of material analysis to the influential (in particular in the 
Italian context) of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. This is noted among others by G. Volpe, Il costituzionalismo 
del Novecento (Laterza 2000) 122-7. As known, Gramsci strongly believed that the only way for obtaining a 
remarkable constitutional change was dependent on the rise of a ‘new prince’ (a revival of Machiavelli’s point 
made in The Prince) which in his view ought to be the political party. This resonates with a peculiar Italian 
tradition of political and constitutional thought, recently highlighted as ‘Italian Thought’ by Roberto Esposito, A 
Philosophy for Europe (Polity 2016) 220-3. 
22 A fair question, at this point, concerns the possibility of a populist constitutional order as populism is usually 
revolving around one simple set of differentiation and specification: the elite vs the people. The realism of the 
material study of the constitution invites a caution attitude towards populism in constitutional law. For an 
analysis see J. Werner-Müller, What Is Populism? (Penguin 2016); P. Blokker, ‘Populism as a Constitutional 
Project’ (forthcoming in International Journal of Constitutional Law).  
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Despite its relevance, one has to note that the material study of the constitution shows 
some outdated aspects besides the risk of economic determinism. In particular, two tenets 
are problematic: one concerns the relation among different material constitutional orders, 
and the other concerns the idea of materiality itself. As for the former, the material study of 
the constitution has been traditionally dedicated to the formation of domestic orders. 
Therefore, it has often postulated that the constitutional order is internal to social relations 
contained within an already defined political unity. Most frequently, such political unity has 
been identified in the modern State whose sovereignty has been conceived as practically 
absolute.23 On the interaction between the political economy undergirding the State and its 
connection with external (i.e., non-domestic) elements no attention is paid, as if that 
political unity were completely autarchic. 
The second problematic aspect concerns the definition of the material level, that is, the 
materiality of the constitutional order. What makes up the constitution of society? In works 
such as those of Smend or Mortati, the material dimension of social organisation was 
organised (if not exhausted) by subjects of mediation such as the nation or the political 
party. Again, in Mortati’s thought the whole work of moulding society is fundamentally 
delegated to the political system which, in a rather traditional way, operates as connector 
between society and the state. 
A key difference with the previous tradition of the material study lies on the undergirding 
assumption of the type of societal production that is behind it. In other words, it is assumed 
that the majority of societies of contemporary constitutional orders are organised according 
to capitalist social relations. This is a key feature which cannot be ignored by the material 
study. In other words, a contemporary material study of constitutional law cannot escape 
the dimension of valorisation which is immanent to those kinds of social relations. 
Predictably, this entails that the material constitution has to be understood as the 
organisation and composition of social forces with a view to generate and increase the 
production of value.24 In a nutshell, each material constitution has its own political economy 
and the two aspects (that is, constitutional ordering and production) are co-implicated. 
Therefore, parts of the fundamental aims of each and every material constitution will be 
partially dictated by the plexus constitution-political economy. 
Let’s pause and clarify this passage. The material constitution is a juristic construction which 
is based on a coupling between the legal order and the political regime. The structuring of 
the material constitution entails that legal and political aspects are an important 
(indispensable) part of the composition and re-composition of social forces. At the same 
time, consolidating a certain asset of social forces around a material constitution requires 
particular forms of law and of political action because sheer facticity, by itself, does not 
have ordering qualities. Here lies the legal institutionalist core of the doctrine of the 
material constitution: certain social formations contain in themselves ordering properties. 
Crucially, such an organisation of social forces is based mostly on the production of societal 
relations. In modern capitalism (and constitutionalism), this means a specific division of 
labour as the most efficient way for producing value while consolidating and stabilising the 
social order at the same time. This entails that even though the material constitution 
provides a stable structure for the constitutional order, social composition of forces is 
always subject to pressures and conflicts (and this is another reason why a formal 
                                                     
23 More on this point will be said in the last section. 
24 A. Negri, Books for Burning (Verso 2005) 235.  
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constitution can help in stabilising the material constitution). Methodologically, the 
consequences cannot be underestimated. As said, the material constitution is a realist 
juridical doctrine, but in the version advocated by Mortati, the realism is still prey to 
sociological relativism (in an almost occasionalist fashion).25 The hegemony built by the 
governing political forces is described in terms that remind closely to the elitist school of 
modern political science,26 as if the battle for hegemony was the product of a fully 
autonomous political field. In other words, the formation of a material constitution is left to 
the choices of powerful political wills. According to this perspective, the fundamental 
political aims would be left to the autonomous choice of the most relevant political actors. 
But from a material perspective this is both insufficient and inaccurate. It is inaccurate 
because if the focus is the production of value in societal organisation, then even the 
political contest for hegemony cannot be reduced to an arbitrary struggle among utterly 
subjective wills, but it has to be inscribed into the framework of a robust political 
economy.27 The choice of fundamental political aims does indeed make sense only within 
that framework. And for this reason, the political system by itself (even if autonomous) 
cannot fully determine the quality and nature of social relations of production. Other factors 
and other subjects have to be factored in for a proper representation of the material level. 
 
III. The Materiality of Global Constitutional Law 
 
Why tracking the material basis of constitutional law is an important epistemic operation? 
As already noted, this is because it gives a more accurate understanding of constitutional 
developments and their underlying logic. The material constitution is part of a wider 
constitutional order which includes the formal constitution as well. The key point is the 
internal relation between the constitutional order and societal formation. Given that such 
an arrangement is a construction based on the condensation of certain social forces around 
selected fundamental political aims,28 it is therefore at this level that the analysis of the 
constitutional order ought to be pitched in the first place.29 
In light of these remarks, two prominent views of global constitutional law will be criticised 
for its manifest lack of concrete material underpinnings. Both in its pluralist and non-
pluralist variations, global constitutional law is formalised in ways that seem to represent 
bits or sections of constitutional law simply upscaling to the transnational or global level. 
One of the defining traits of all proposals by global constitutionalists lies in the recognition 
of the exhaustion of state’s centrality. While the description of the constitutionalisation of 
certain parts of global or transnational law is usually described in terms which cannot be 
straightforwardly assimilated to juridification, these processes are still described in fairly 
normative terms which remain largely unconnected to their material basis. Either global 
constitutional law is the product of a type of constitutional reasoning whose legitimacy lies 
                                                     
25 M La Torre, ‘Costantino Mortati and the Fascist Doctrine of Public Law’, in C. Joerges (ed), Darker Legacies 
(Hart 2003) 305-20. 
26 E.g., Wilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. 
27 There is no space here to develop further this point, but the material constitution does not create an 
autonomous political field. In the last section it will be outlined why this is the main difference with other 
state-based approaches such as political jurisprudence. 
28 On the selective character of the material constitutional order (but framed in a different language), see B. 
Jessop, The State (Polity Press 2017). 
29 It seems that this is the level engaged by Mark Tushnet in his contribution to this special issue: ‘The 
Globalization of Constitutional Law as a Neo-Liberal Project’. 
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ultimately in the quality of the reasoning itself and on its normative weight,30 or, in different 
forms, it is functionally created in order to manage global or supranational needs, either in 
the form of administrative law or in the form of transnational rights.31  
Given that some of these versions of global constitutional law make reference to a social 
base either in the form of practices or by focussing on the formation of contemporary 
society, it is worth further unpacking this criticism. In the first case, global constitutional law 
is the outcome of the expansion of constitutional principles’ normative force beyond the 
jurisdiction of the state at the supranational and international level. The argument, 
suggested with great insight by Mattias Kumm,32 is based on what he defines as the 
‘practice conception of constitutionalism’. The authority of constitutional law is not 
conceived in positivist terms according to its pedigree and, in this way, it can be properly 
expanded and projected beyond the state framework. According to this view, constitutional 
orders can be established by just about any legal or political procedure. Negatively, 
constitutional authority is disentangled from the source thesis, and it is made to derive 
‘from the constitutional principles it claims to instantiate and give concrete shape to’.33 
Positively, constitutional principles are obtained by the reconstruction of practices whose 
main point is usually included in principles themselves. However, the practices behind these 
principles are already constitutional and they are described in the following terms: ‘the 
practice conception of constitutionalism connects the underlying ideas of constitutionalism 
more directly and deeply with constitutional practice, without mediation by the voluntarist 
positivist, nationalist statist conceptual framework […] the normative presuppositions of 
constitutionalism are translated directly into a set of basic formal, jurisdictional procedural, 
and substantive legal principles that are conceived as underlying existing legal and political 
practices and in light of which that practice can be reconstructed and assessed’.34 
Constitutional principles are understood as structural features, but their status seems to be 
free-floating. In particular, the principles that govern the relationships between different 
transnational and state-based constitutional orders do not themselves derive their authority 
from either one or the other. Their validity stems from the reasons they convey, though it is 
not made explicit against what those reasons are judged. The rationality of global 
constitutional principles is in the end detached from social relations and it does not bear any 
link with the relative political/constitutional form. Its validity is effective thanks to its 
reasonableness which is tied to classic constitutionalist values.35 
A radically different take, more sociological in approach, has been advanced in its most 
developed and sophisticated form by Gunther Teubner. He sees in the globalisation of 
constitutions a series of fragments which have been ‘internally’ constitutionalised.36 The 
fragments that become constitutional at a global or supranational level are such for 
functional reasons: for example, the systems of science and economy tend to strive toward 
global reach for inner reasons. Their internal functionally-oriented rationality is a potent 
driver which brings these systems decisively beyond the boundaries of the modern State. 
                                                     
30 M. Kumm, ‘The Best and the Worst of Times’, in P. Dobner, M. Loughlin (es), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2010) 201-19.  
31 See, for example, N. Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
32 For a first formulation, see M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 907-31. 
33 Kumm, (see n 30), 214. 
34 Ibid. 
35 It is not by accident that three of these principles are the rule of law, democracy and human rights. 
36 G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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Their ‘constitutionalisation’ comes with their coupling to some constitutional rights which 
makes possible to introduce a certain level of reflexivity internal to the system itself.  
Hence, according to this approach, constitutionalisation37 beyond the State happens in two 
steps: 1) there is a second-order moment where rules or principles about the fragments of 
supranational or global law are reflexively discussed or modified, so that it is possible to 
correct (either functionally or normatively) the legal status of these fragments; 2) human or 
fundamental rights provide a mediation in the process of constitutionalisation. The picture 
that emerges out of this reconstruction is of a series of fragmented constitutionalised 
systems that communicate with their environment through their respective codes. In brief, 
constitutional fragmentation is the form of global law. The marginalisation of the state (and 
of the governing function) is part and parcel of this project and cannot be avoided as 
fragmentation is ‘merely an ephemeral reflection of a more fundamental multi-dimensional 
fragmentation of global society itself’.38 Their seems to be a social basis undergirding this 
hypothesis: the proliferation of constitutional sites is guided not by territorial but social-
sectoral lines. Yet, the lack of a material level of analysis which cuts across social systems is 
the reason why Teubner refers to fragmentation, while a more appropriate description 
would probably be ‘constitutional asymmetries’ between the state and the global levels.  
it is not surprising that many global constitutionalists identify the main vectors of the global 
upscale in constitutional rights. This is indeed common to different strands of the debate, 
from sociological to normative constitutionalists.39 The constitutionalisation of rights is the 
vector for the creation of global fragments of constitutional law for two reasons: rights 
make the upscale intelligible from a constitutional perspective and rights seem to be more 
flexible and open to be decontextualized more easily than other institutions of modern 
constitutionalism. Now, the problem is that it is not clear why the constitutional tool that is 
chosen for developing constitutional law at the global and transnational levels are rights and 
not, say, other classic modern constitutional instruments such as separation of powers or 
federalism. In this sense, normativist and functionalist conceptions of global constitutional 
law are under-descriptive because they can possibly justify but not explain the forms taken 
by the process of constitutionalisation. This is a problem that affects functionalist 
explanations of constitutional law: it is not clear why constitutional law (and, in this case, 
global constitutional fragments) has taken up a determined or concrete form, and not 
another one, unless one postulates the absence of functional equivalents. From the 
perspective of the material study, this remains a crucial question for constitutional analysis. 
 
IV. The forms of global constitutional law 
 
The question of the form taken by constitutional law is central to the material study. In 
order to avoid any misunderstanding, it is better to pinpoint that the material constitution is 
not the opposite nor the hidden engine of the formal constitution. With the exception of 
cases of sham constitutions, the relation between the two constitutions is one of 
integration, not of stark opposition. More specifically, the material constitution provides the 
                                                     
37 See the critical discussion of this term by M. Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’, in M. Loughlin, P. 
Dobner (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (n 28) 69-72. 
38 A. Fischer-Lescano, G. Teubner, (2004) ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity Join the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999, 1004. 
39 See K. Möller, Global Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2012); C. Thornhill, A Sociology of 
Constitutions (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
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key for understanding why the constitutional order has taken up certain forms. In other 
words, the material study of the constitution sheds light on the rationality of the form of 
law by replying to the question: why this social order has given to itself these forms of law 
and not others? Often, these forms can function as a glue for holding the dominant social 
and political forces together, as it is the case in many post World War II constitutional 
settlements. This is in clear contrast with a functionalist understanding of the relation 
between social organisation and constitutional norms. In the functionalist account of 
sociological constitutionalism, constitutional developments are explained in terms of 
systemic inclusion,40 usually through the means of rights. Global constitutional law is often 
correctly described as a series of fragments which upload some systems (science, 
technology, trade) to the global level,41 while leaving others within the boundaries of the 
modern State, or, in the version offered by Chris Thornhill, as the development of 
international norms that are introjected by the nation State (in this way, internationalisation 
is actually a way to strengthen the national level as well).42 No concrete explanation of why 
certain institutions (and not others) were functional for the inclusionary qualities of a 
constitutional order is offered. There can always be functional equivalents which might 
perform the same function of already established institutions. Such an approach to global 
constitutional law does not address the constitutional question of why this form of law (if 
there is any form of law at all) and not another one.43  
At this point, two questions are pressing: What are the main forms of global constitutional 
law? And why global constitutional law has taken this scattered and asymmetrical form? 
The first question really puts the idea that there is something constitutional about global or 
supranational forms of regulation under a lot of pressure. In fact, the question whether 
global constitutional law is truly a genuine form of constitutional law is a fair one. The 
uploading to the global level of sections of constitutional law has been realised in many 
forms and only some of them can be deemed to be constitutional in any meaningful sense. 
Often, in light of the informality of certain practices, global governance (rather than 
constitutionalism) seems to capture the interaction among national, supranational and 
global actors in a more accurate way. Perhaps, some global constitutionalists would simply 
dismiss these practices as irrelevant to constitutional law or, as Krisch advocated a few years 
ago, as a series of practices that basically comprise a new pluralist structure of postnational 
law.44 Be that as it may, an overview of these forms of global law show that some of them 
are necessarily located in a grey area which might turn out to be legally neutral. But from 
the perspective of the material study, these practices can also be reconstructed as part and 
parcel of a composition or re-composition of social forces around concrete political goals. 
These are legal or para-legal forms that have a shaping effect on certain practices, but 
ultimately, they can be linked to the control of the governing function of the state. The 
latter, it should be recalled, always rests on the principle of differentiation between those 
                                                     
40 For a recent overview, see P. Blokker, C. Thornhill (eds), Sociological Constitutionalism (Cambridge University 
Press 2017). This collection shows that the current sociological study of constitutionalism is a refined and 
complex field whose richness cannot be taken into account in the space of an article. In brief: not every 
sociological approach to constitutional studies is functionalist. See, for example, K. Lane Scheppele, 
‘Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction’ (2004) 38 Law & Society Review 389-406. 
41 G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 36) chapter 1. 
42 C. Thornhill, A Sociology of Transnational Constitution (Cambridge University Press 2016).  
43 A similar criticism against functionalist explanations is put forward by B. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of 
Law, (Cambridge University Press 2017) 44. 
44 N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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that are governed and those who govern. In a nutshell, the trajectory or the purpose of the 
material constitution contains (besides the essential normative elements derived from its 
institutionalist nature) a relationship of command and obedience.45 This applies to the 
relation between the level of the State and supranational and global forms of constitutional 
law.46 
To the second question (why this form?) one might answer in terms of failure or incapacity 
to shape a fully-fledged global constitutional order. However, the material underpinnings of 
these scattered fragments of constitutional law seem to point more toward the 
implementation of a new series of conventions replacing old social and political 
compromises. A material analysis of global constitutional law emphasises the key role 
played by states at the supranational and global level as they remain the most important 
point of reference of legal developments. In that sense, fragments of global constitutional 
law cannot constitute an autonomous (meaning: original), but only a derivative set of legal 
orders.47 The recognition of states’ centrality in global constitutional law does not 
undermine the constitutional nature of the latter. States (or, at least, some of them) have 
allowed portions (sometimes quite conspicuous portions) of regulation to be delegated to 
the supra-State level in order to achieve a series of political goals which would not have 
been possible without coordination in the international field. Again, in a mediated form, 
these transnational or global fragments of law have taken up the consistency of a regime. A 
derivative regime, but nonetheless a regime, whose undergirding political economy can 
qualify as very close to other orders. The recognition of this state of affairs means that (1) 
we are observing changes in the nature of states’ constitutional orders and (2) the ordering 
forces are an emanation of an effort of certain sectors of state’s social factions, through a 
coordinating device that is often made possible by institutional forms at the supranational 
level (an example could be represented by the recent waves of free trade agreements, with 
some clauses containing the duty to respect certain rights or environmentally friendly 
clauses). The European Union and the World Trade Organisation represent obvious 
examples of this trend, but other regimes (for example, the regime of regulation of 
intellectual property) have also developed into derivative material constitutions. 
In order to illustrate the previous points, I will stick only to one example, but one that is key 
for the organisation of important sectors of global constitutional law and, even more 
importantly for the thesis put forward in this article, for the exercise of the governing 
function at the level of the state. It is a classic case of mixing different levels of 
constitutional intervention and re-scaling the exercise of government. An international 
political regime based on financialisation has been forming and consolidating in the last 
three decades,48 one that has shaped states’ budgetary policies (through austerity measures 
                                                     
45 This is a key difference with the Schmittian understanding of the absolute constitution, which still rests on 
the driving distinction between friend and enemy. Cf M. Croce, A. Salvatore, The Legal Theory of Carl Schmitt 
(Routledge 2013) chapters 2 & 3. 
46 Though it should be made clear that this implies observing global and supranational developments from the 
point of view of the state. 
47 On this distinction I follow S. Romano, The Legal Order (Routledge 2017). On Romano’s thought see M 
Loughlin, Political Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2017) ch 7. A different question is whether there are 
non-State original constitutional orders, a question on which Romano would agree (canon law, for example). 
See also the brilliant analysis by R. Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 94 Harvard Law Review 4-64. 
48 I follow here the arguments made first by C. Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing (Verso 2010); W. 
Streeck, Buying Time (Verso 2015); see, also, A. Negri, ‘On the Constitution and Financial Capital’ (2015) 32 
Theory, Culture and Society 25-38; J. Vogl, The Ascendancy of Finance (Polity 2017). 
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and competition on financial markets for funding their public debt) and has contributed to 
the reform of labour markets across a wide spectrum of states and jurisdictions. Streeck has 
aptly defined this transformation as the passage from the ‘fiscal’ to the ‘debt state’.49 It is 
interesting to note that such an international political regime is both constituted by state 
and supranational institutions, comprising a derivative but new constitutional order and at 
the same time one that is impacting on the states’s governing function, more specifically on 
the definition of its fundamental aims. The financial process of valorisation behind this 
section of global constitutional law directs (or helps) the contemporary state in steering the 
governing function toward new directions, forcing the re-ordering of specific social relations 
by setting up new ‘condensations’ of social forces.50 Certain institutions and practices (some 
formal, other rather informal) underlie this financial convention: the delicate equilibrium of 
the international monetary system, the IMF, the Basel III criteria, the monetary dialogue 
among central banks, etc etc. In a nutshell, in the last few decades we have seen a 
transformation of the compromise among productive forces which marked many 
constitutions of the post-World War II settlement: from the Fordist compromise, which 
formed the material basis of many 20th century constitutions (with the explicit recognition 
of the compromise between capital and labour at their core and the relative support of the 
Bretton Woods international monetary system which pushed central banks in using the 
value of labour productivity as the measure for the monetary basis) to the international 
political regime based on financialisation,51 one in which the monetary sphere (finance 
capital, as a shorthand)52 establishes the political hegemony over social production and 
reproduction, and therefore also over division of labour.53 To avoid any misunderstanding, 
such a financial regime cannot be pitted against modes and relations of production, as a late 
Polanyian reading might want to highlight.54 The Welfare state becomes the consolidated 
state, with a restructuring of its fiscal capacities and all the consequences of such a change 
on productive social relations. Note that this entails that global constitutional law cannot be 
necessarily understood as an expansion of the constitutional realm within the scheme of a 
progressive narrative.55 It should be added, indeed, that one of the main purposes (but not 
the only one) of global constitutional law is to transform the state and its form. In an 
                                                     
49 Streeck (n 48) ch 2. 
50 This reading had been already suggested, in a seminar article, published originally in 1973, now collected in 
N. Poulantzas, The Poulantzas Reader (Verso 2008) 220-57. 
51 D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Verso 2006) 296. 
52 The debate on the nature of finance capital (and whether this can be separated from productive capital) is 
as old as the works of Rosa Luxenbourg and Hilferding. See C. Lapavitsas, Profiting without Producing (n 48); N. 
Dodd, The Social Life of Money (Princeton University Press 2014) ch 8. 
53 On the problematic change of the constitutional nature of labour-related arrangements and problem of 
uploading these to the global realm see the brilliant pages by R. Dukes, The Labour Constitution (Oxford 
University Press 2015) ch 7. 
54 Echoes of this position are present in the otherwise extremely brilliant reconstruction by W. Streeck, Buying 
Time (n 48). 
55 This is the limit of an analysis which is otherwise extremely insightful, as the one provided by B. Ackerman, 
We the People: Transformations (Harvard University Press 1998). Ackerman would not agree that his theory of 
informal constitutional transformation can be read with material lenses, but at least the third constitutional 
moment (the New Deal) is a classic reconstruction of the constitutional relevance of the material constitution. 
However, given that Ackerman does not address the material dimension in explicit terms (and he prefers to 
adopt an Arendtian reading of modern constitutionalism), he has to postulate that each constitutional 
moment represents an expansion of the inclusionary capacity of the constitutional order (abolition of slavery, 
constitutionalisation of labour, civil rights redemption, etc etc). 
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important sense, Chris Thornhill is right when he draws a trajectory of the globalisation of 
constitutional law in five phases, with the latter being the introjection of human rights law 
into domestic constitutional orders.56 However, a caveat ought to be added at this point: 
this introjection is not necessarily functional to the stabilisation of the state and it is not 
evident that the introjection of global fragments of constitutional law serves an inclusionary 
function at the domestic level. Hence, it does not necessarily stabilise state constitutional 
orders. Sometimes the opposite is the case. Even the introjection of international 
fundamental rights might bring about controversial effects within the domestic realm. The 
new arrangements concerning the governing function have generated an enormous 
pressure over states, at times bringing about de-constitutionalising outcomes or the 
transformation of the state material constitution. 
Actually, this is the first of two main lessons that can be learned from the material study of 
global constitutional law. At times, global constitutional law is riddled with some potentially 
unsettling contradictions, usually because of the complexity of the governing arrangements 
sought after by certain fractions of constitutional law. In the longer term, tensions between 
the main driving forces of the material constitution might degenerate and de-stabilise the 
constitutional order (or dismantling important aspects of its legal fabric). Here, Polanyi’s 
classic insight might be actually very helpful: it is not clear, at this point in time, whether 
certain arrangements are sustainable and whether they will bring about a counter-
movement. 
The second major insight is that law is not always a key element in the transformations 
behind global constitutional law. In particular, the emphasis on the positive or negative 
virtues of judicialisation seems to be exaggerated.57 Courts have played an important role in 
certain circumstances, in particular in the context of European constitutionalism. However, 
besides the thorny issue of the legitimacy of arbitrational arrangements (and whether 
arbitration can be qualified as a form of judicial power), other institutions or fora have 
emerged in the global scenario and they seem to have occupied a prominent role in 
exercising a governing function at both supranational and national levels. The recent 
financial crisis has not seen the judiciary at the forefront (except for the legalisation of 
controversial measures) but rather a constellations of different national and supranational 
institutions. It would be sufficient to mention, here, the governing role exercised by rating 
agencies upon State budgetary discipline, the coordinated intervention of central banks in 
many regions or the guidelines given by the European Commission during the European 
semester. In both cases, judicial intervention has appeared, at best, as a confirmation rather 
than a creation or development of new legal regimes.  
 
v. Sovereignty and Government in Global Constitutional Law 
 
As already noted, the material study of global constitutional law promotes an analysis 
centred around forms of constitutional and political unity, which in the contemporary 
context are still primarily represented by the state. This resonates with a strand of 
                                                     
56 Thornhill, A Sociology of Transnational Constitutions (n 42) ch 2. 
57 For negative evaluation of the expansion of judicial power see R. Hirschl, Juristocracy (Harvard University 
Press 2004). A classic study of how to govern though judicial power is A. Stone Sweet, Governing by Judges 
(Oxford University Press 2000). Ammon Reichman is addressing some of the issues affecting judicial review 
after the globalisation of certain constitutional rights in his contribution to this special issue: ‘The Patronizing 
Trap: Constitutional Rights, Risks, and the Transnational Dimension’. 
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constitutional studies focussed on the unity of the legal order and its preference for the 
state as the only non-derivative (i.e., sovereign) form of order. Yet, the latter strand is prone 
to dismiss too quickly the contribution of global constitutional law for the knowledge of 
state constitutional orders as, at best, a derivative form of law or just soft law whose impact 
is temporary and superficial.58 But this judgment is based on an ungrounded assumption. 
More precisely, state-centred theories of modern constitutional law are often premised on 
the twin ideas of absolute sovereignty of modern statehood and the exceptional nature of 
that type of sovereignty.59 According to this approach, the state is not a field of struggle 
around which gravitate different (and often antagonistic) social groups, but the form that 
enables the autonomy of politics. Hence, it is not surprising that other forms of 
constitutional law are marginalised or even not registered as constitutional:60 they do not 
represent the type of achievement that is realised by a state constitution. Given the 
centrality of the latter for constitutional imagination, all other forms of supranational or 
global constitutional law are at best reconstructed as projection of state-centred law or, at 
worst, as threats to the integrity of the above mentioned constitutional imagination.  
The core distinction of this constitutional approach is the separation between the principle 
of sovereignty and government, a constitutive and frequent feature of the European 
political and constitutional thought on the state.61 The separation is understood not as a 
matter of degree but as categorical: sovereign and ordinary powers belong to different 
levels. Indeed, there is deep discontinuity because sovereignty cannot be reduced to the 
ordinary institutions, while ordinary powers represent the constitutional normality. Hence, 
the modern state can always disentangle itself from the internal and external constraints 
imposed by governmental action with a sovereign decision. In other words, sovereignty and 
government belong to two separate levels. Constitutional imagination is shaped by 
sovereignty, not government.62 The latter operates always within already defined 
boundaries. Therefore, state sovereignty is conceived as a scheme of intelligibility which 
organises the significance of internal and external orders.63 From this perspective, 
international law is the only other site of legitimate law because it derives from that 
imagination. Global constitutional law is reduced to an ephemeral phenomenon built on 
quicksand and therefore can often be called into question quite quickly. 
                                                     
58 For example, Dieter Grimm notes that the international and the global level (unlike the EU) do not have the 
range of powers and organisational density to be able to qualify as constitutional. In other words, they do not 
have the capacity of forming political and constitutional unity. At the global level ‘there are some isolated 
institutions with limited tasks, most of them single-issue organisations and with correspondingly limited 
powers. They are not only unconnected, but sometimes even pursue goals that are not in harmony with each 
other, such as economic interests on the one hand and humanitarian interests on the other. Rather than 
forming a global system of international public power they are islands within an ocean of traditional 
international relations’: D. Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed 
World’, in Dobner, Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (n 30) 18. 
59 I refer here to the works of three representative authors from different jurisdictions: P. Kahn, Putting 
Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton University Press 2004); id., Political Theology (Columbia University Press 
2011); M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010); id., Political Jurisprudence 
(Oxford University Press 2017); D. Grimm, Sovereignty (Columbia University Press 2017). 
60 P. Kahn, ‘The Question of Sovereignty’ (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 259-82 
61 See, e.g., for historical analysis, R. Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign (Cambridge University Press 2015); for a 
reconstruction of this distinction in Rousseau’s thought: Loughlin, Foundations (n 57) 158-161. 
62 M Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Imagination’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 1-25. 
63 Cf J. Scott, Seeing like a State (Yale University Press 1988). 
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This picture of state sovereignty is not only outdated, but inaccurate both historically (in 
terms of state formation and developments) and conceptually (in terms of the formalisation 
of the concept of sovereignty).64 First, as illustrated by legal historians,65 in concrete terms 
sovereignty has never been an absolute and transcendental source of power, but rather a 
relational principle which would develop in diverse ways according to different contexts. 
Hence, different sovereignties have been attached to different forms of state: for example, 
the sovereignty of the European state cannot be assimilated to the sovereignty of the 
developmental (and post-colonial) state. Rather than assuming sovereignty as a 
transcendental principle, sovereignty is understood as the mediating principle between the 
organisation of the social order (and of civil society) and the formation of political and 
constitutional unity. At this stage, an institutionalist take on sovereignty becomes necessary. 
Conceptually, such an understanding differs sensibly from the conception classically inspired 
by Hobbes. According to the latter, sovereignty emerges in order to overcome the state of 
nature and hence society is parasitical to the previous formation of the state order. The 
institutionalist idea of sovereignty embodies the logic at work in the relation between the 
social and the constitutional order. In brief, sovereignty maintains the relation between 
political unity and society without collapsing one into the other. There is nothing arbitrary 
about it and its operations in concrete situation does not postulate (as it happens with many 
sovereign-based approaches) that sovereignty precedes law.  
Given the mediating role of the principle of sovereignty, it becomes clear that it cannot be 
separated categorically from the governing function. The formation of constitutional orders 
is always within the exercise of governmental power. The lessons of the institutionalist 
approach to the constitution are still valid on this point: the processes of formation and re-
formation of political orders can be productive of sovereign units, but this is always the 
outcome of a mediating exercise of governing.66 For this reason, the contemporary state 
(and in particular the European state above the others) can be described as a state that has 
introjected bits and pieces of supranational and global law as part of its material 
constitution. For example, this phenomenon has been aptly described (in accurate material 
terms) by Chris Bickerton with the idea that the European state has become a ‘Member 
State’.67 
In conclusion, both narratives on the development of global constitutional law sketched out 
in the previous paragraphs shed a light on certain assumptions driving the current debate 
on the rise of global and supranational constitutional law. Both narratives are coins of the 
same medal.68 They both offer important insights into the relation between state and global 
constitutional orders, but they share the problem of ignoring the material dynamics behind 
the development of contemporary constitutional law. The material study of global 
constitutional law maintains the narrative of the centrality of the state as the key political 
unity but does not consider it as an absolute achievement of the autonomy of politics, as it 
                                                     
64 For the modification of the concept of sovereignty, see N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003); 
cf H. Kalmo, Q. Skinner (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
65 E.g., L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press 2010). Sociologically, this point has 
been made with great emphasis by S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights (Princeton University Press 2006). 
66 It should be noted that Loughlin is rather attentive to the act of governing of sovereign states but it does not 
attribute to it a constitutive role: M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (n 14) ch 3. 
67 C. Bickerton, European Integration (Oxford University Press 2012). Another analysis conducted along these 
lines (though without the same material undertones) is put forward by A. Somek, The Cosmopolitan 
Constitution (Oxford University Press 2014). 
68 S. Mezzadra, B. Neilsen, Border as Method (Duke University Press 2013) 218-20. 
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is the case for the advocates of the state-based perspective. The distinction between 
sovereignty and government is contextualised because the first concept is understood as a 
mediation between multiple social forces obtained through the establishment of a stable 
form of political unity and the second concept describes the processes that mobilise all 
constitutional powers in order to achieve and maintain that form. Sovereignty remains 
central in the contemporary context, but not as a site for exclusive political self-
determination. Sovereignty remains essential for the production and reproduction of 
societal relations. For this reason, the material study of global constitutional law cannot do 
without an analysis of its undergirding political economy. 
